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AN HISTORIOGRAPHIC LABEL, ITS EVIDENCE, ITS 
MISUNDERSTANDING AND ITS FUTURE: 
WITTGENSTEINIAN THOMISM 
ABSTRACT: The aim of my paper is to explain the label Wittgensteinian Thomism and to 
show its relevance in the history of contemporary philosophy. I will proceed through three 
steps. First of all, I will take the birth of this label into consideration. In the second step I 
will study in detail Wittgenstein’s references to Aquinas. The fact that Wittgenstein 
possessed the first two volumes of the Summa Theologica is well-known, but the influence 
that Aquinas had on Wittgenstein must be clarified. I will conclude distinguishing two 
different levels in the use of the label Wittgensteinian Thomism: it can be appreciated as an 
historiographical or as a theoretical tool. 
SOMMARIO: Lo scopo del presente articolo è quello di spiegare la definizione di 
Wittgensteinian Thomism e di mostrare la sua rilevanza nella storia della filosofia 
contemporanea. Procederò attraverso tre passaggi. Innanzitutto, prenderò in considerazione 
la nascita di questa etichetta. Nella seconda parte del lavoro studierò in dettaglio i riferimenti 
di Wittgenstein all’Aquinate. Il fatto che Wittgenstein possedesse i primi due volumi della 
Summa Theologica è ben noto, ma si deve approfondire l’influenza dell’Aquinate sul pensiero 
di Wittgenstein. Concluderò distinguendo due diversi livelli nell’uso linguistico del 
Wittgensteinian Thomism: come strumento storiografico oppure teorico. 
KEYWORDS: Wittgenstein; Aquinas; Analogy; Being; Kenny 
For the first time in 1992, during some conferences held at the ‘Maritain 
Center’ (Notre Dame University), thanks to John Haldane a new label 
appeared in contemporary philosophical historiography. He proposed 
Analytical Thomism as a label not to indicate “a movement of pious 
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exegesis, but to suggest how it is possible to deploy the methods and ideas 
of twentieth-century philosophy – of the sort dominant within the 
English-speaking world – in connection with the broad framework of ideas 
introduced and developed by Aquinas”.1 This current is usually divided 
into two sub-currents: the first is the Wittgensteinian Thomism2 and the 
second is the Geach-Fregean Thomism,3 as Roger Pouivet in 1997 and 
Giovanni Ventimiglia in 2012 dubbed them respectively. It is possible to 
trace the origins of these two sub-currents: the Geach-Fregean Thomism 
originated in a conference held by Peter Geach at the ‘Aristotelian Society’ 
(London) in May 19554 and the Wittgensteinian Thomism arose in a 
conference delivered by Anthony Kenny at the ‘Socratic Club’ (Oxford) in 
May 1958.5 Despite the common reference to Aquinas, these two 
approaches6 are quite independent for the following reasons: (1) some 
authors are engaged in both projects, but a lot of scholars belong only to 
one of them; (2) they take different themes into consideration: 
Wittgensteinian Thomism has to do with epistemology, philosophy of mind 
and philosophy of theology, while Geach-Fregean Thomism is involved in 
metaphysics, ontology and natural theology; (3) the appreciation of 
Aquinas is quite different: in Wittgensteinian Thomism his contribution is 
esteemed, while in Geach-Fregean Thomism his thought is criticized and 
there are also those who consider Geach-Fregean Thomism impossible and 
misleading.7 Kenny’s researches are a specimen of this dichotomy. In his 
                                                                          
1 J. Haldane, “Analytical Thomism. A Prefatory Note”, The Monist, 80, 1997, p. 486. 
A previous formulation can be found in Id., “Thomism, analytical”, in T. Honderich (ed.), 
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 875. For 
a general approach see M. Micheletti, Tomismo analitico, Brescia, Morcelliana, 2007. 
2 See R. Pouivet, After Wittgenstein, St. Thomas, Indiana, St. Augustine’s Press, 2006 
(ed. or. Après Wittgenstein, saint Thomas, Paris, Puf, 1997). 
3 See G. Ventimiglia, To be o esse? La questione dell’essere nel tomismo analitico, 
Roma, Carocci, 2012. 
4 See “Form and Existence”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 55, 1954-5, p. 251-
271; reprinted in Id., God and the Soul, London, Routledge-Kegan Paul, 1969, p. 42-64. 
5 See A. Kenny, “Aquinas and Wittgenstein”, The Downside Review, 77, 1959, p. 
217-235. This was Kenny’s first philosophical publication: see A. Kenny, A Path from 
Rome, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 141. 
6 Really, another relevant approach in the analytic field has to be mentioned: it is formed 
by Norman Kretzmann’s and Eleonore Stump’s interpretations that are characterized by an 
exegetic claim. 
7 See F. Kerr, “Un thomisme analytique?”, Revues des sciences philosophiques et 
théologiques, 92, 2008, p. 556-573; B.J. Shanley, “On Analytical Thomism”, The 
Thomist, 62, 1999, p. 125-137 (it. tr. “Tomismo analitico”, Divus Thomas, 24, 1999, 
p. 79-91); J.F.X. Knasas, “Haldane’s Analytic Thomism and Aquinas’s Actus essendi”, 
An Historiographic Label: Wittgensteinian Thomism 
 201 
brief monograph on Aquinas, he concludes the last chapter on Aquinas’s 
philosophy of mind with this appreciation: “Aquinas’s doctrine of the 
intentional existence of forms remains one of the most interesting 
contributions ever made to the philosophical problem of the nature of 
thought”. On the contrary, Kenny’s opinion at the end of the previous 
chapter on Aquinas’s philosophy of being is expressed thus: “even the most 
sympathetic treatment of these doctrines cannot wholly succeed in 
acquitting them of the charge of sophistry and illusion”.8 The discrepancy 
between these two judgements is confirmed in the following Kenny 
monographs on Aquinas. The first consider the study of Aquinas necessary 
to contribute to themes as mind, perception, imagination, intellect, 
appetite, will, freedom, sense, universals of thought, knowledge of 
particulars, self-knowledge, soul, relationship between mind and body;9 the 
second, published almost ten years later, ends with a list of twelve different 
senses of the verb to be considered incoherent.10 
I propose to pay attention to Wittgensteinian Thomism not only 
because of its relevance, but, first of all, because it has a textual ground. 
Following the diachronic development of the parallelism between Aquinas 
and Wittgenstein, the pioneers that must be quoted are Cornelius Ernst 
(1924-1977) who taught Fergus Kerr “that what Thomas meant by saying 
that the soul is the form of the body is pretty much what Wittgenstein 
meant by saying that the human body is the best picture of the human 
soul”11 and the eclectic Dominician Herbert McCabe (1926-2001) “who 
learnt how to address both Thomas’s questions and Wittgenstein’s within 
a single enquiry”.12 Pouivet follows Gilbert Ryle, Geach, Elizabeth 
Anscombe and Kenny and he associates Aquinas and Wittgenstein with 
                                                                                                                                                                              
in C. Paterson, M. S. Pugh (eds.), Analytical Thomism. Traditions in Dialogue, 
Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006, p. 233-251; M. Pérez de Laborda, Tomismo analitico, in F. 
Labastida, J.A. Mercado (eds.), Philosophica: Enciclopedia filosofica on line, 2007 
(http://www.philosophica.info/archivo/2007/voces/tomismo_analitico/Tomismo_
Analitico.html) e S. Theron, “The Resistance of Thomism to Analytical and Other 
Patronage”, The Monist, 80, 1997, p. 611-618 (repr. in Paterson-Pugh, Analytical 
Thomism, p. 225-232). 
8 A. Kenny, Aquinas, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 80 and 60. 
9 See Id., Aquinas on Mind, London, Routledge, 1993. 
10 See Id., Aquinas on Being, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2002. 
11 F. Kerr, After Aquinas. Versions of Thomism, Oxford, Blackwell, 2002, p. 21. 
12 See H. McCabe, God Still Matters. Foreword by Alasdair MacIntyre. Edited and 
introduced by Brian Davies, London, Continuum, 2002, p. VIII; Id., God Matters, 
London, Continuum, 2005 (or. ed. 1987), and Id., On Aquinas. Edited by Brian Davies. 
Foreword by Anthony Kenny, London, Continuum, 2008. 
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regard to externalism in epistemology, conception of mental acts in 
philosophical anthropology, intentionality in philosophy of language, will 
and freedom in moral philosophy. For these reasons he suggests that there 
is a theoretic common ground between Aquinas and Wittgenstein and that 
it is reasonable to speak of a current, that he is the first to name 
Wittgensteinian Thomism. Pouivet’s book is heavily indebted to Kenny’s 
and Geach’s works, but I think it can be considered a primary source from 
an historical point of view not only because Pouivet is the first to introduce 
the label Wittgensteinian Thomism, but above all because he is the first to 
have identified a tendency in contemporary thought common to different 
scholars that cannot be reduced to extemporaneous or occasional 
comparisons between Aquinas and Wittgenstein. In his words: 
the way of being Thomistic advanced by Geach, Anscombe, and Kenny is entirely 
different. It is no longer a question of criticizing modern thought in the name of a 
Christian tradition ridiculed by Enlightenment rationalism, as the neo-scholastics 
tended to do; nor is it even an attempt to return medieval philosophy to its rightful 
place in universities and other institutions of higher learning, as the historians of 
medieval philosophy have often proposed. Instead, it is an effort to understand St. 
Thomas in light of the possible reinterpretations of the Summa Theologica made 
available to us by Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. This approach is 
neither ideological nor historical, but philosophical, in the sense that, after 
Wittgenstein we need the illuminating insights of the Summa Theologica; we need 
the conceptual tools that are the primary concepts of St. Thomas’ philosophy. Geach 
or Kenny will often on the same page go from Wittgenstein to St. Thomas. There is 
no historical chasm between Thomas and Wittgenstein, or at least the chasm is not 
as large as the one between modern philosophers (Descartes or Kant) and 
Wittgenstein. This is what enables Thomas Aquinas, in the interpretation offered 
here, to come after Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein makes Aquinas more understandable 
and enables us to grasp the extent to which Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy 
continues to be of great value.13 
Moreover, some years later, Kerr explicitly refers to ‘proto-wittgensteinian 
arguments’ taking the Aquinas’ theory of mind, and in particular the 
question of introspection, into consideration: 
Augustine believed that, by the power of introspection, we could reach, to some 
degree, a vision of God, within ourselves though beyond ourselves. This was then, 
and to some extent remains, an immensely powerful and influential alternative to 
Aquinas’s proto-Wittgensteinian conception of the dependence of our inner life on 
our involvement with things in the public world. [...] Thus, Aquinas has a proto-
                                                                          
13 Pouivet, After Wittgenstein, St. Thomas, p. 6-7. 
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Wittgensteinian conception of how subjective experience depends on our 
engagement with objects in the public world [...]14 
The relevance of Aquinas’ quotations by all the above mentioned scholars 
must be evaluated carefully because the use of Aquinas’ works is not always 
adequate and sometimes it seems more rhetoric than real.15 More than once 
the references are implicit and not clear or, at best, not immediate.16 It is 
relevant to note, for example, that in Pouivet’s book the only reference to 
ontology is the distinction between esse naturale and esse intentionale, but 
no Aquinas quotation is used. More carefully, Kenny made a comparison 
between the answer given by Aquinas and Wittgenstein to the question 
“What makes a thought of X be a thought of X?”, concluding: 
I have attempted to combine Aquinas’ theory of intentional existence with the 
prima facie very different account of intentionality sketched by Wittgenstein. The 
resulting theory, if I am right, has the merit that it enables one to avoid the realist 
idealism of Platonism without falling into the conceptualist idealism of many anti-
realist, past and present.17 
In any case Wittgensteinian Thomism was appreciated as a fruitful field of 
inquiry able to promote the studies on Aquinas, to support some 
interpretations of Wittgenstein and to determine the philosophical agenda. 
Haldane’s works in the philosophy of mind18 are the most relevant 
example. This scholar suggests looking carefully at Aquinas because this 
medieval philosopher thinks of the objects in the world as becoming 
intelligible through actualising our intellectual capacities (intellectus in actu 
est intelligibile in actu19): this approach has implications on epistemic and 
                                                                          
14 F. Kerr, “Aquinas after Wittgenstein”, in J. Haldane (ed.), Mind, Metaphysics, and 
Value in the Thomistic and Analytical Traditions, Notre Dame (Indiana), University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2002, p. 6. 
15 See, for example, F.X. Putallaz, “Wittgenstein, saint Thomas et l’intériorité, une 
discutable lecture de Roger Pouivet”, Revue Thomiste, 111, 2011, p. 35-65. 
16 See G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention, Oxford, Blackwell, 1957; P.T. Geach, Mental 
Acts, South Bend (Indiana), St. Augustine’s Press, 1971; G.E.M. Anscombe, P.T. Geach, 
Three Philosophers, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1961; A. Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, 
London, Routledge, 1963; Id., The Anatomy of Soul, Oxford, Blackwell, 1973; and Id. The 
Metaphysics of Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989. 
17 A. Kenny, “Intentionality: Aquinas and Wittgenstein”, in Id. (ed.), The Legacy of 
Wittgenstein, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1984, p. 76. 
18 See J. Haldane, “La filosofia contemporanea della mente e il bisogno di tomismo 
analitico”, Iride, 17, 2004, p. 619-629. 
19 See In II Sententiarum, ds. 17, q. 1, art. I, resp. ad 4; Summa Contra Gentiles, bk I, 
ch. 46, n. 3; Summa Theologica Ia, q. 12, art. 9, obj. I et passim. 
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ontological realism,20 on the question of mind-world identity,21 on the 
nature of language,22 on the nature of the intellect,23 on the problem of 
personal identity24 and on the notion of form.25 Among the most relevant 
contributions in Wittgensteinian Thomism the following deserve to be 
remembered: the question of abstractionism;26 the discussion of the 
epistemological grounds of certainty;27 the relationship between the 
linguistic level and the ontological one;28 the refusal of the concept of the 
self29; themes belonging to the philosophy of theology;30 the consequences 
of its anthropological presuppositions on bioethics;31 De Anna’s work on 
realism and mental representation32 and my studies on the notion of 
intentionality33 and on a new proposal of natural theology.34 For each of 
these themes an anthology of Aquinas’s and of Wittgenstein’s passages 
could be drawn up. In the case of Aquinas it could be useful to point out 
                                                                          
20 See J. Haldane, “San Tommaso e Putnam: realismo ontologico e realismo 
epistemologico”, Intersezioni, 8, 1988, p. 171-188 and Id., “On Coming Home to 
(Metaphysical) Realism”, Philosophy, 71, 1996, p. 287-296. 
21 See Id., “Mind-World Identity Theory and the Anti-Realist Challenge”, in J. 
Haldane, C. Wright, Reality, Representation, and Projection, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1993, p. 15-37. 
22 See Id., “The Life of Signs”, Review of Metaphysics, 47, 1994, p. 451-470. 
23 See Id., “Analytical Philosophy and the Nature of Mind: Time for Another 
Rebirth?”, in R. Warner, T. Szubk (eds.), The Mind-Body Problem: a Guide to the Current 
Debate, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1994, p. 195-203. 
24 See Id., “(I am) Thinking”, Ratio, 16, 2003, p. 124-139. 
25 See Id., “A Return to Form in the Philosophy of Mind”, Ratio, 11, 1998, p. 253-277. 
26 See Geach, Mental Acts.  
27 See P. Bearsley, “Aquinas and Wittgenstein on the Grounds of Certainty”, The 
Modern Schoolman, 51, 1974, p. 301-334. 
28 See J.P. O’Callaghan, “Concepts, Beings, and Things in Contemporary Philosophy 
and Thomas Aquinas”, Review of Metaphysics, 53, 1999, p. 69-98 and Id., Thomist Realism 
and the Linguistic Turn. Toward a More Perfect Form of Existence, Notre Dame, 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2003. 
29 See A. Kenny, The Self. The Aquinas Lecture 1988, Milwaukee, Marquette 
University Press, 1988 and F. Kerr, “Work on Oneself”. Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Psychology, Washington, Catholic University of America Press, 2008. 
30 See B. Davies, “Letter from America”, New Blackfriars, 84, 2003, p. 371-384; F. 
Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986 and Id., 
“Transubstantiation after Wittgenstein”, Modern Theology, 15, 1999, p. 115-130. 
31 See P. Sgreccia, Tomismo analitico, etica e bioetica, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 2011. 
32 See G. De Anna, Realismo metafisico e rappresentazione mentale. Un’indagine tra 
Tommaso d’Aquino e Hilary Putnam, Padova, Il Poligrafo, 2001. 
33 See M. Damonte, Wittgenstein, Tommaso e la cura dell’intenzionalità, Firenze, 
MEF, 2009. 
34 See Id., Una nuova teologia naturale. La proposta degli epistemologi riformati e dei 
tomisti wittgensteiniani, Roma, Carocci, 2011, p. 141-222. 
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which aspects of his thought are relevant today and to evaluate the validity 
and the coherence of their fruition. 
It is remarkable that in this list ontological themes are quite absent with 
the only exception of the notion of esse intentionale which is very relevant, 
but which is not studied in depth explicitly. As we have seen, they are a 
prerogative of Geach-Fregean Thomism, but it must be underlined more than 
once that the only textual reference of Wittgenstein to Aquinas regards the 
theme of being. A first, obscure passage is from Kenny’s quoted article: 
perhaps I should remark in conclusion that the rapprochement I have attempted has 
not been entirely in the air. One of the very few philosophical works which 
Wittgenstein kept on his shelves was the Pars Prima of the Summa. Asked one day 
what he thought of St Thomas, he replied that he could not make much of his 
answers, but he thought his questions were very good. Coming from Wittgenstein, 
this was high praise. The Investigations contain 784 questions. Only 110 of these are 
answered; and seventy of the answers are meant to be wrong.35 
Geach confirmed this from an autobiographical point of view: 
I remember on his book-shelves [...] a German-language selection from Aquinas’s 
Summa Theologica.36 
Only Garth Hallett is more careful: 
Among the few philosophical works in W’s possession when he died Rush Rhees lists 
two volumes of the Summa Theologica, in the Puster edition (Salzburg and Leipzig, 
1934), which gives the German o the top half and the Latin on the lower half of the 
page. The first volume, given to W. by Ludwig Hänsel in 1938, contains Part One, 
Articles 1 to 13; the second, which Hänsel gave him a year later, contains Articles 14 
to 26. “The only remark of Wittgenstein’s about Aquinas that I remembered”, adds 
Rhees, “was that who found him extremely good in his formulation of questions but 
less satisfactory in his discussion of them”.37 
In a private correspondence dated February 2016, Michael Nedo – the 
Director of the ‘Ludwig Wittgenstein Trust at Cambridge’ – told me that 
unfortunately after the death of Rush Rhees, his inheritance (including 
Wittgenstein’s books) was not dealt with in a professional manner and 
that, as a result, most of his books were dispersed among different book 
                                                                          
35 Kenny, Aquinas and Wittgenstein, p. 235. 
36 P. Geach, “History of Philosophy”, in H.A. Lewis (ed.), Peter Geach. Philosophical 
Encounters, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1991, p. 45. 
37 G. Hallett, A Companion to Wittgenstein’s “Philosophical Investigations”, Ithaca 
and London, Cornell University Press, 1977, p. 761. This passage is also quoted in Kerr, 
Theology after Wittgenstein, p. 154 and Haldane, The Life of Signs, p. 451. 
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dealers. Nedo added that Rhees showed him the volumes of the Summa 
and that he is quite certain that they did not contain any annotation by 
Wittgenstein, otherwise he would have copied them. In any case the 
following question is legitimate: is there a lesson Wittgenstein learned from 
Aquinas? An annotation taken by Wittgenstein in 1949 could be read in 
this fashion: “God’s essence is said to guarantee his existence – what this 
really means is that here what is at issue is not the existence of 
something”.38 Following Kerr this is a clear allusion to what Aquinas wrote 
in the third Quaestio of the first part of the Summa Theologica: 
whatever its difficulties, and whether or not it secures the radical difference between 
everything and God that Aquinas thought it did, to Wittgenstein it seemed to have 
nothing to do with existence.39 
Already in the Tractatus Wittgenstein distinguished various types of being. 
In 3.323 and 3.143, for example,40 Wittgenstein catalogued some cases in 
which the superficial grammar does not correspond to the logic form and 
he referred to the word is explicitly. It can be used as copula, as a sign of 
equality or as an expression of existence. Just studying in depth the general 
logical form of the propositions, Wittgenstein opened his thought to the 
ineffable, to God and to the Mystic.41 Peter Winch notes that, for 
Wittgenstein, the way of speaking about religion is different from the way 
of speaking about science and, in particular, that the term existence is not 
                                                                          
38 L. Wittgenstein, Cuture and Value, Oxford, Blackwell, 1998, p. 94. This quotation 
in found in MS 138 30b and it is dated 17.3.1949. 
39 Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein, p. 154. See L. Perissinotto, “Grammatica e 
esistenza. L’argomento ontologico e la filosofia analitica”, in L. Perissinotto, M. Ruggenini, 
I. Sciuto, E. Severino, L. Tarca, I. Valent, C. Vigna (eds.), Dio e la ragione. Anselmo 
d’Aosta, l’argomento ontologico e la filosofia, Genova, Marietti, 1993, p. 87-89. 
40 3.143: that the propositional sign is a fact is concealed by the ordinary form of 
expression, written or printed. For in the printed proposition, for example, the sign of a 
proposition does not appear essentially different from a word. (Thus it was possible for 
Frege to call the proposition a compounded name). 3.323: in the language of everyday life 
it very often happens that the same word signifies in two different ways – and therefore 
belongs to two different symbols – or that two words, which signify in different ways, are 
apparently applied in the same way in the proposition. Thus the word ‘is’ appears as the 
copula, as the sign of equality, and as the expression of existence; ‘to exist’ as an intransitive 
verb like ‘to go’; ‘identical’ as an adjective; we speak of something but also of the fact of 
something happening. (In the proposition “Green is green” – where the first word is a 
proper name as the last an adjective – these words have not merely different meanings but 
they are different symbols.) 
41 See Perissinotto, Grammatica e esistenza, p. 87-89 and 95-97. 
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univocal, but its meaning depends on its use in a specific language.42 So, the 
notion of existence is not only a major theme of Wittgensteinian Thomism, 
but Wittgenstein must be appreciated as the ‘gateway’ to analytical 
Thomism, to use John Cahalan’s metaphor43. Real existences are what is 
known at first and this became the criterion to evaluate existential 
quantification (Tractatus 5.552), and, at the same time, to take intentional 
existence into consideration and moreover to reflect on the causal 
relationship between these two types of existence. Since in the Blue Book, 
which contains the notes dictated to his students during the lessons of the 
semester 1933-4, Wittgenstein had already distinguished different 
meanings of the term to exist: saying that something does not exist is one 
thing, while saying that a man exists is quite another. Even more so, saying 
that a centaur exists and even further saying that redness exists.44 Moreover 
he quoted the Tractatus. Ventimiglia, following Geach, suggests a 
parallelism between the distinction reference of a name / its bearer made by 
Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigation and the distinction made by 
Aquinas esse in rerum naturae / esse ut actus essendi45. Wittgenstein 
considered problems about being the principal troubles in philosophy: 
One keeps hearing the remark that philosophy really doesn’t make any progress, that 
the some philosophical problems that occupied the Greeks keep occupying us. But 
those who say that don’t understand the reason it must be so. That reason is that our 
language has maintained constant and keeps seducing us into asking the same 
questions. So long as there is the verb ‘be’ that seems to function like ‘eat’ and ‘drink’ 
[...] humans will continue to bump up against the same mysterious difficulties, and 
stare at something that no explanation seems able to remove. This, by the way, 
satisfies a longing for the transcendental, for in believing that they see the ‘limit of 
human understanding’ they of course believe that they can see beyond it.46 
Wittgensteinian Thomism is relevant for contemporary debates in ontology 
with regard to four aspects. The first is that it helps us to consider the 
importance to take not only the various uses of the verb to be into 
consideration, but above all to pay attention to different types of 
                                                                          
42 P. Winch, Meaning and Religious Language, in S.C. Brown (ed.), Reason and 
Religion, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1977, p. 200-213. 
43 See J.C. Cahalan, Wittgenstein as a Gateway to Analytical Thomism, in Paterson-
Pugh, Analytical Thomism, p. 195-224. 
44 See L. Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books. Preliminary Studies for the 
“Philosophical Investigations”, Oxford, Blackwell, 1975, p. 30-31. 
45 See Ventimiglia, To be o esse?, p. 101-105 and P.T. Geach, Aquinas, in Anscombe, 
Geach, Three Philosophers, p. 91. 
46 L. Wittgenstein, The Big Typescript, XII (Philosophy), 90, 8, p. 313. 
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existence47. In this respect it stimulates a passage from the linguistic level to 
the metaphysical one. A similar passage must be done also for the notion of 
analogy: this is the second aspect. In the case of being as existence, analogy 
is not only a family resemblance between the appearance of different 
objects, but first of all it consists in the various meanings that the verb to be 
assumes in different contexts, i.e. in different uses.48 The third aspect 
concerns meta-ontology, in fact Wittgensteinian Thomism implies that the 
question about the essence and the existence are relevant also for (natural) 
theology and religion and not only for the stuff of the empirical world. So, 
Wittgensteinian Thomism overcomes some disciplinary barriers that 
separate different fields of philosophical enquiry. Finally, sustaining that in 
God there is no composition of esse and essence, does not coincide with 
affirming that it is possible to define God as being itself (ipsum esse 
subsistens49), as, for example, Davies says50. Denying this composition in 
God is not only compatible with negative theology, but is its quintessence 
and this is preliminary to referring to God as ipsum esse subsistens because it 
sets the meaning of esse in this last expression. Barry Miller notices a 
parallelism between Wittgenstein’s position about identity – he argues that 
identity is not a relation at all – and Aquinas’s argument according to 
which the mark of Subsistent Existence is not merely superiority, but 
transcendence.51 In the last conference on these arguments held on the 15th 
of May 2015 at the ‘Istituto di Studi Filosofici in Lugano’ (Switzerland), 
Kenny in the spirit of Geach-Fregean Thomism introduced the term anitas 
(i.e. what answers to the question an est?) distinguishing it from the term 
quidditas (i.e. the answer to the question quid est?) to solve some problems 
in the interpretation of Aquinas’ ontology and, in particular, to analyse the 
word esse more in detail.52 In the case of God, if it is an absurdity to say that 
                                                                          
47 See G. Ventimiglia, “There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’. Il 
ritorno dell’analogia dell’essere nel cosiddetto ‘tomismo analitico’”, in P. Bettineschi, R. 
Fanciullacci (eds.), Tommaso d’Aquino e i filosofi analitici, Napoli, Salerno, Orthotes, 
2014, p. 215-219 where In IV Metaph., bk 1 and In X Metaph., bk 4 are quoted. 
48 See R. Teuwsen, Familienähnlichkeit und Analogie. Zur Semantik genereller 
Termini dei Wittgenstein und Thomas von Aquin, Freiburg, Alber, 1988. 
49 See In I Sentiarum, ds. 23, q. 1, art. I, resp. ad 4 et passim; Summa Contra Gentiles, 
bk I, ch. 17; bk. 3, ch. 19, n. 3 et passim; Summa Theologica, I, q. 3. See E. Berti, “Il 
‘tomismo analitico’ e il dibattito sull’Esse ipsum”, Giornale di Metafisica, 31, 2009, p. 6-35. 
50 See B. Davies, “Aquinas, God, and Being”, The Monist, 80, 1997, p. 500-517. 
51 See B. Miller, The Fullness of Being. A New Paradigm for Existence, Notre Dame, 
University of Notre Dame, 2002, p. 16, 133 and 156-157. 
52 See A. Kenny, “Quidditas and Anitas after Frege”, Giornale di Metafisica, 1, 2016, 
p. 109-118. 
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His essence coincides with His anitas, it is interesting to ask if His essence 
coincides with His own actus essendi (that indicates the individual 
existence of an ens, as Kenny has affirmed in Aquinas on Being).53 The 
essence is linked to a modality of living, as a potentiality is linked to an 
actuality. To comment the previous quotation takes from Culture and 
Value, Kenny quotes Summa contra Gentiles I, 22, 208 to indicate that 
there is a correspondence in saying that God is ipsum esse subsistens and in 
saying that He is actum purum. Kenny ends suggesting that perhaps 
Aquinas does not intend that in God esse and essence coincide, but that 
their distinction is inapplicable to God, as the distinction between odds 
and evens is inapplicable to colours. This interpretation has the advantage 
to make a difference between God and creation because it appreciates the 
existence (esse) of God not a way of existence, but the fullness and the 
beginning of what exists. However, as it has the drawback of generating as a 
gap between the God of the philosophers and the God of revelation, 
because it suggests that in God there is no life. Aquinas was conscious of 
this problem and took the Aristotelian distinction between transitive and 
intransitive actions into consideration.54 
This perspective confirms that Wittgensteinian Thomism is able to 
articulate an often-overlooked fact: the work of the later Wittgenstein can 
help us discern the lasting value of Aquinas’ ontology. At the same time 
Aquinas can help the reader avoid an influential misreading of 
Wittgenstein. Let’s take the question of analogy as a paradigmatic example. 
In this case the comparison between Wittgenstein and Aquinas was 
underlined, for the first time, by Brian Davies in 1992: 
there is a modern parallel to Aquinas’s notion of analogy in the work of the 
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). In his Philosophical Investigations, 
Wittgenstein speaks of what he calls ‘family resemblances’. A word, he says, though it 
is not always used in the same sense, need not always be used in a sense unrelated to 
that which it has on a given occasion.55 
The problem with this assertion is that it is based on too hurried a reading 
of the two authors considered. Davies does not quote them properly, 
neither does he contextualize them fairly. Wittgenstein’s position is 
summarized as follows starting from paragraph 66 of the Philosophical 
Investigations: 
                                                                          
53 See De Veritate, q. 10, a. 12. 
54 See Summa Theologica I, q. 18 art. 3. 
55 B. Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, p. 74. 
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As the member of a family can resemble each other without looking exactly like each 
other, so, affirms Wittgenstein, words can sometimes mean something different on 
different occasions without meaning something entirely different on the occasions 
in question.56 
Aquinas’ interpretation is based on religious language and it refers to 
Summa Theologica T I, 13: 
This is very close to what Aquinas teaches concerning the way in which terms are 
applied to God and creatures. We may say, for example, that Solomon is wise and 
that God is wise. We do not mean that God’s wisdom is just what Solomon’s 
wisdom amounts to. But nor do we mean that it is something wholly unlike this. 
Solomon and God are alike, even if they are also very different. In calling both of 
them wise we are not equivocating. But neither are we putting them on a level with 
each other.57 
Even if Davies is quite prudent of his own position, his suggestion was 
ascertained by the secondary literature on this topic.58 This parallelism is 
grounded on philosophy of language and it does not take any ontological 
element into consideration. This is misleading, in fact the notion of 
analogy is used by Aquinas first of all in the language about being, and only 
in a second step in theological language. In its ontological value it could be 
compared with Wittgensteinian position. This means that Aquinas’s 
doctrine of analogy might be better understood if it is likened with 
Wittgenstein’s doctrine of ‘meaning as use’ and, conversely, that 
Wittgenstein’s theory of ‘family resemblances’ could be better appreciated 
in the context of Aquinas’ proposal about abstraction. 
I conclude distinguishing different levels in the use of the label 
Wittgensteinian Thomism: it can be appreciated as an historiographical or 
as a theoretical instrument. In the first case, it indicates a current of 
contemporary history of philosophy and, in particular, an area of Analytical 
Thomism or, better, an area of the Twentieth-century Thomism. My aim 
was to shed light on the relationship between Wittgensteinian Thomism 
and Geach-Fregean Thomism through the notion of ontological analogy. In 
the second one, it denotes a set of historiographical and theoretical thesis 
useful to discuss some post-modern philosophical presuppositions. In this 
regard, Wittgensteinian Thomism has not only a cultural value, but its 
                                                                          
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 See M. Damonte, “Somiglianze di famiglia: un modo contemporaneo per dire 
analogia?”, Archivio di filosofia, 84, 2016, p. 239-251. 
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ontological and anthropological claims are worth studying in depth 
because they can contribute to changing the dialectical forms of 
philosophizing. In short, Wittgensteinian Thomism seems able to promote 
the exegesis of some difficult passages of Wittgenstein and of Aquinas and 
to indicate the agenda of the studies of both of them. In particular it 
encourages a rediscovery of Aquinas in order to face up to contemporary 
problems in metaphysics. 
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